An Explanation of the Maxim: Leges Posteriores Priores Contrarias Abrogant by Nana-Aishah Manzumah



If there are two conflicting laws applicable to a circumstance, situation or fact, it bears the question of which of these two conflicting laws shall be considered and applied. One cannot just take any one based on speculative mind since the law has to be certain. In this vain, this piece brings to you a thorough research of the subject matter with adequate authorities.

The maxim “Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant is translated as [s]ubsequent laws repeal prior conflicting ones” — See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), Page 5327. To put differently, later laws abrogate earlier contrary ones. It is a principle which states that, where two laws or legal instruments conflict, the one adopted later in time, rather than the one adopted earlier, is considered binding on the relevant parties. That is, when two statutes conflict, the one enacted last prevails. The provisions of a later document are contrary to those of an earlier, the earliest must be considered as repealed. By this virtue, the maxim is referred to as the ‘doctrine of implied repeal'.

As opposed to express repeal of law by the legislature through the passage of bill and enactment of an Act for amendment of an existing law, this principle is an implied repeal. It applies to cases where two or more statutes are mutually inconsistent to such an extent that it becomes impossible for them to be in force concurrently. However, this doctrine is only applicable only when there is no possibility of harmonious construction of the conflicting laws and the two cannot stand together. By implication, a repeal may not be necessarily inferred or implied if the provision of the two seeming conflicting Acts/Laws could be reconciled.

For a better justification to the understanding of the maxim, it is proper to seek solace in the decided case of ROTIMI WILLIAMS AKINTOKUN v. LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE (LPDC) (2014) LPELR-SC.111/2006. The issue for determination in this case was whether the Supreme Court could directly entertain appeals against directions of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) as held in a number decided cases vis-à-vis CHARLES OKIKE v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE (NO.1) (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt.266) 1176 at 1203. The fact being that, there was a conflicting provision of the Legal Practitioner's Act of 1990 and the Legal Practitioner Act of 2004, both being valid enactments of the National Assembly. While the 1990 enactment gave the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to hear appear directly frim the LPDC, the 2004 enactment requires that an appeal against the direction of the LPDC needs to be first channeled to the Appeal Committee before the Supreme Court could exercise its appellate jurisdiction thereafter.

The Supreme Court after much deliberations and consideration dismissed the appeal. It was the argument and submission of Counsel to respective parties including those invited as Amicus before the Supreme Court, among others, that the previous law of the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No. 21 of 1994 had not been expressly repealed, and as such, the  Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals directly on directions of the LPDC.

The Panel of Justices of the Supreme Court, however, held contrarily, that the position of the law was that ‘where there are two existing laws governing the same area of law, but there was a conflict between the two laws and it would be impossible to reconcile an interpretation of the two laws, the later law would prevail over the earlier law'. This is a clear demonstration and application of the maxim. The Court posited thus:

"In Law, therefore, there are circumstances in which a repeal of an enactment can be implied or inferred and that is where two acts of the legislature are plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time. Thus, repeal by implication cannot be prohibited where circumstances warrant."

Emphatically, the Court further stated that:

"I think, the law is that where a later enactment does not expressly amend [whether textually or indirectly] an earlier enactment, but the provisions of the later enactment are inconsistent with those of the earlier, the later by implication, amends the earlier so far as is necessary to remove the inconsistency between them. This is because, if a later Act cannot stand with an earlier one, parliament, generally, is taken to intend an amendment of the earlier. This is a logical necessity, since two inconsistent texts cannot both be valid. If the entirety of the earlier enactment is inconsistent, the effect amounts to an implied repeal of it. Similarly, a part of the earlier enactment may be regarded as impliedly repealed where it cannot stand with the later. An intention to repeal an Act or enactment may be inferred from the nature of the provision made by the later enactment. The Latin maxim puts it that LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT [later laws abrogate prior contrary laws]". [Emphasis added].

The Panel of Justice,  hence, relying on the maxim “Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant”  came to the conclusion that Section 12 of Cap L11 2004 LFN in re-establishing the Appeals Committee and granting it exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from directions of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, impliedly repealed the former law of the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No. 21 of 1994, which stripped the Supreme Court of any jurisdiction to hear appeals from directions of the LPDC.

However, for every general, there is always exception(s) to that effect. This mean that, the operationalization of the maxim is not without exception(s). Hence, one of its exception also lies in the maxim “Genaralia Specialibsus Non Derogant” translated as “a general provision does not derogate from a special one”. Howbeit, this would be succinctly covered in our next weekly legal-nugget. It is thus hope that adequate justification has been laid to the maxim — Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant!


Written by: 

        Nana-Aishah Manzumah, 

        Member, Litigation Committee

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