The Illegality-cum-Ultra Vires Debates on the New Dress-Code for Women in the NPF: A Rejoinder to the Submissions of Mr. Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, S.A.N. By Amusan Tawfiiq 'Lekan

The news of the new dress-code for female officers in the Nigeria Police Force surfaced on the internet on the 4th of March, 2022 and, as expected, was instantaneously welcomed with all manner of criticisms - ranging from the scornfully sardonic to the intellectually lugubrious. Of all the gazillion of criticisms, the one that seemed most-deserving of a reaction, as it appeared to this writer, was that the authorship of which was attributed to the Learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Mr. Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa which could be read through the link attached hereunder {https://themetrolawyer.com.ng/adegboruwa-accuses-igp-of-using-new-police-dress-code-to-enforce-religion/}. This writer wouldn't have deemed making a rejoinder a worthy exercise, as already alluded to, if this particular article (being reacted to) had come from a personality who is of a relatively lesser recognition or authority than the Learned Silk in the eyes of the public.

The strong and endearing affiliation of the Learned Silk to the Human Rights Activism in Nigeria was also contributory to how, unsurprisingly though, attentions deflected away easily from all other critics of similar legally harsh inputs and heavily centered on him. Granted, as submitted by the Learned Silk, there are zillions of issues bedevilling the smooth delivery and operation of the Nigeria Police Force, as of today. No doubt. In fact, the exhibition of a shaky or almost-inept craftsmanship by the leadership of the NPF in stabilizing the worrying issues appertaining to national security is enough reason for one to consign to finding an escape route from this country. However, none of those reasons has a direct connection with the totality of assertions which, with respect, are boldly but unsubstantially put up in the post which is the subject-matter of this rejoinder.

In a bid to not make this rejoinder too long, I'll only restrict myself to highlighting the major points to which I strongly disagree from the post under critique. The first is the issue of ILLEGALITY. In fact, the Learned Silk wasted no time in declaring the action of the Inspector General of Police illegal as his position was unequivocally stated even right from the title choice of the post. Seeing as this is a rejoinder, I feel I have the mandate - a strong one at that - to come off as simply as possible so that its actual essence will not be lost in the process of trying to sound grandiloquent or overly technical. Of your interest therefore will be the fact that whenever, in law, an act is said to be illegal, the one and only thing it means in simple and layman's term is that, "there is no basis upon which it could be founded in law". The Blacks Law Dictionary also defined “illegal” to mean, "Not authorized by law; Illicit; Unlawful; Contrary to law".

Upon a careful perusal of the above-quoted definition of "illegal" by the Blacks Law Dictionary and as it relates to the instant case, can we ever come to a logical conclusion that such act of the Inspector General of Police is illegal? No, of course not. And this is because, contrary to the Blacks Law Dictionary's  definition, the IGP is well authorised by a subsisting and operational law validly made by the National Assembly to have a say, in respect of the physical appearance of the Police Personnel in Nigeria. Evidencing and authorizing this assertion is the provision of sec. 9(1)(e) of the Police Act, 2020. For the avoidance of doubt, the said-provision is hereunder quoted in extenso:

"The powers and functions of the Inspector-General of Police shall include:

(e) ensuring the PHYSICAL, mental, and psychological well-being of all Police Personnel". (Emphasis is mine).

More of interest again is the paragraph (f) of the same sub-section which, to the heavy support of the Inspector General of Police, includes the issue of welfarism of the Police Personnel. It's therefore the strong counter-submission of this writer that the IGP acted within and in pursuance of the powers conferred on him by a valid and operational law.

Similarly, the Learned Silk also declared the act of the IGP to be ULTRA VIRES solely on the ground, which this writer found very much disturbing to stomach, that it contravened the provisions of ss. 10 and 42 of the 1999 Constitution. If the Blacks Law Dictionary definition is anything to go by in mollifying the Learned Silk's anger and annoyance, it defines Ultra Vires to mean, "Acting or done beyond one's legal power or authority". How does anyone then manufacture an argument in such a way as to be in keeping with the Blacks Law Dictionary's definition supplied above when even a Learned Silk could have an unsuccessful attempt? The only arguments canvassed by the Learned Silk was that the action was in breach of ss. 10 and 42 of the CFRN even though, I'm quite sure, a legal luminary of his caliber will definitely know that there can't genuinely be a claim put up by him under this paragraph unless there are clear actions from the government subjugating certain religious practices to others in a manner of obligation.

Furthermore, assuming without conceding that the act of the IGP had a religious motive, the immediate question that should pop up in any unbiased person's mind should be “whether such act was exercised as to give effect to the provisions of sec. 38 or, as boldly but unsubstantially asserted by the Learned Silk, violate the joint provisions of ss. 10 and 42 of the CFRN”. The only way to getting an apt answer therefore will be by construing the said directives with a clear mind so as to see whether it’s still within the permissibility of sec. 38 or prohibitions of ss. 10 and 42 of the CFRN. Even in our courts, the fundamental human rights— one of which is the right to freedom of religion— have been duly recognised as natural rights which must stand above the ordinary law of the land and at the same time be constitutionally guaranteed. See the cases of Chief Francis Igwe & Ors v. Mr. Goddy Ezeanochie & Ors (2010) 43 WRN; Badejo v. Federal Ministry of Education (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 464) 15. All these long writings about sec. 10, in this writer’s humble but necessary view, will only be necessitated if and only if the words used in the said-directives suggest an obligation. But they do not. Frankly, I do not know what has given rise to this kite which flew over the horizon of an otherwise clear position of the law.

At this juncture, I'll be drawing the curtains on the very room of this rejoinder but not without addressing the funny but very much sensible worries expressed by the Learned Silk over the possibility of faithful of different religions coming up with demands for similar thingamajig on the ground of equal treatment. In quizzing such ratiocination, apposite would be the posers as to; firstly, whether headscarf, as described in the said directives, even has any special ascription to the Islamic religion in the first place; secondly, whether a traditionalist even need the permission of any authority to tie charms around his waist in the first place; thirdly, whether a Christian faithful, particularly of Celestial denomination as cited by the Learned Silk, is forbidden from putting on shoes even when he's not in church or on his way to church putting on Sutana and; lastly, whether such directives, as issued under the authority of the IGP, has by any means conferred on certain female officers in the Police Force, what they are not ordinarily entitled to. If those posers are all answered in the negative; then, your guess is as good as mine about the catholicity of all the hues and cries respecting the breach of sec. 42 of the CFRN.

Amusan Tawfiiq ‘Lekan is a 500L Student of the Faculty of Law, Bayero University, Kano. He can be reached via Vickmanbaolad@gmail.com as well as +2348108012253