ON WHEN A COURT BECOMES FUNCTUS OFFICIO, ITS EFFECT & EXCEPTION(S) THEREOF
It is a cardinal principle of jurisprudence that, when a
court has made a decision in respect of a matter brought under its inherent
power, such a court becomes, by operation of the law, functus officio. The
principle of functus officio has been defined in the Blacks Law
Dictionary as a situation where an officer or official body is without further
authority or legal competence because the duties and functions of the original
commission have been fully accomplished.
To further buttress the point, the courts have made
numerous attempts at defining the term. In the Supreme Court decided case of DINGYADI
V INEC (No.1) (2011) 18 NWLR Part 1224, Page 1, at 186 Para D-F, per
Chuwuma-Eneh JSC, held that:
…the principle
of functus officio ... connotes that a Court as this Court having given its
decision in a matter before it ceases to have the power to reopen the same
matter all over again in the same proceedings… And so, the Court becomes
functus officio and incapable of giving any decision or making any competent orders
with regard to the same matter it has previously decided for want of the
jurisdiction to do so.
In a coda, once a court makes an order or gives judgement
in an action, it becomes functus officio and ceases to possess the
power to vary or review such an order or judgment. However, there are
exceptions to this rule, which lie in two circumstances: (a) the circumstance
of the slip rule, and (b) the circumstance of setting aside its judgement. See MOHAMMED
v. APC and ORS (2019) LPELR-CA/K/137/2019 and CITEC INTERNATIONAL
ESTATE LTD. AND ORS v. FRANCIS AND ORS (2014) LPELR-SC.116/2011.
This position of the law on the moment when a court is
deemed functus officio and the slip rule exception was equally visited
by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal in the case of HOLBORN (NIGERIA)
LTD. v. O.C.C. ENTERTAINMENT LTD. [2015] 1 NWLR 451 appearing on the
face of the image attached to this weekly nugget.
The fact culminating in the appeal before the Court of
Appeal is simply that the trial court delivered its judgement on the 13th
day of October 2006 in a suit in favour of the respondent (then, the
plaintiff)—O. C. Chris Enterprises Nigeria Limited. Among the reliefs the
Respondent sought in his amended statement of claim against the Appellant
(then, the Defendant) at trial court was:
An inquiry as to damages or at the plaintiff’s option, an account
of the profits made by the defendant whether by itself and all other persons
and firms howsoever described which the plaintiff know and those it cannot
identify by reason of the infringement of plaintiff’s copyright or proprietary
right in the use of the Kafal Rubber Design by the defendant and all such persons and firms.
OR ALTERNATIVELY, the plaintiff’s claims against the
defendant and all the sum of Ten
Million Naira (N10,000,000) as general damages for the defendant’s infringement
of the plaintiff’s proprietary right to the use of the registered number 5528
by producing for sale and distribution, the textile products carrying thee.
Kafal Rubber Design.
In granting the entire reliefs prayed for by the
Respondent at the trial court, the trial court ordered, inter alia, as follows:
e) An inquiry as to damages or at the Plaintiffs option, an account
of the profits made by the Defendant whether by itself and all other persons
and firms howsoever described which the Plaintiff know and those it can not
identify by reason of the infringement of Plaintiffs copy right or proprietary
right in the use of the KAFAL RUBBER DESIGN by the Defendant and all such
persons and firms.
The learned trial judge perhaps mistakenly omitted to
include the award of ₦10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira) in favour of the
Respondent as alternatively prayed.
Due
to the reluctance of the Appellant (then the defendant) to comply with the
order of the court, the respondent subsequently, via a Motion on Notice dated
11th July, 2007, sought the
following orders:
"1. An order requiring the judgment debtor/respondent to explain the delay in submitting, delivering and vouching an account in this matter as directed by this honourable court in its judgment dated 13th October,2006.
2.
An order giving such directions as the court may deem fit with
regard to the manner in which the account is to be taken or vouched.
3.
An order directing the expediting of the submission delivery and
vouching of the said account to wit: that the judgment debtor/respondent do
submit, deliver and vouch the said account within 7 days of the making of the
orders by the court."
4.
And such order or further orders as the court may deem fit to make
in the circumstances of this case.
However, in the course of giving its ruling on the 4th
day of October, 2007 on the motion on notice filed by the Respondent, the trial
court observed that there was an error in the judgement earlier delivered on
the 13th day of October, 2006, not including the alternative relief
sought by the Appellant. The trial court, having noted the error, made the
following comment:
In the interim,
this court perused the contents of the judgment and orders delivered on the
said date in open court and discovered certain clerical errors and omissions
which need clarification presently. It is now well settled beyond any doubt
that where a judgment is in need of clarification or correction in respect of
clerical slips, errors or omission, there is power under the law for the same
court that delivered the judgment to correct the clerical slips, errors or
accidental omission.
In support of its decision, the court cited the
following: Federal Public Trustee v. Mrs. C. A. Sobamowo (1967) NMLR P.350,
among others, vis-à-vis Sections 251 and 252 of the 1999 Constitution and Order
27-7 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000.
The
trial court further held that:
"Accordingly,
from the foregoing paragraphs of this ruling, the judgment of this court dated
13th day of October 2006, order are hereby amended to reflect the said
accidental slips, clerical errors and omissions therein pursuant to the
inherent jurisdiction of this court as provided for in the above mentioned
sections of the 1999CFRN and the FHC (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2000."
In effect, the trial court, in its ruling on the said
motion on notice, on its own volition and without any application being brought
before it, amended the judgement that it had delivered a year earlier on the
ground that it discovered clerical errors and omissions that needed clarification.
Hence,
one of the grouses of the appellant at the Court of Appeal was whether the
power of the trial judge under Order 27 Rule 7 of the Federal High Court Rules
2000, to correct mistakes or errors arising from any accidental slip or
omission, extends to substituting his awards for another and thereby making an
award which he had not earlier made, and whether this can be done suo-motu (of its own volition). During the
course of the resolution of the issue as raised, the Court of Appeal held that:
It is an
established principle of law that once a court or tribunal delivered its final
judgment in a case before it, it becomes functus officio with respect to that
case. It has no power to re-open the case for the purpose of making corrections
or changing any opinion expressed in its earlier judgment in the case. The only
exception to the rule is where there is need to make minor permissible
correction under the slip rule.
The
Court further continued stating the position of law on altering and varying an
earlier judgement when it held that:
What can be
altered under the slip rule is not as to the substance of the judgment earlier
delivered that limited in minor errors such as spelling errors,
typographical or mathematical errors wherein correct figures can be entered.
However, a quick question is as to the extent of the
applicability of the "slip rule" as an exception to the principle of functus
officio!
The slip rule is one of the two exceptions to the
circumstances in which a court becomes functus officio. The slip rule,
as defined by Ariwoola, is the power given to a court of law to correct or
amend the terms of its own orders or judgements to effect such variations
therein in such a way as to carry out the meaning which the court intended. For
instance, if the language used in the phrasing of the order is ambiguous, does
not express the order actually made by the judgment, or is otherwise open to
misapprehension, it may be corrected to make it clear. See: ENTERPRISES
BANK LTD v. AROSO & ORS (2015) LPELR-SC.166/2003(R).
And to the extent of the applicability of this rule, the
learned wisemen of the Court of Appeal further stated that:
What can be
altered under the slip rule is not as to the substance of the judgment earlier
delivered that limited in minor errors such as spelling errors, typographical
or mathematical errors wherein correct figures can be entered.
This thus implies that the slip rule, as an exception to functus
officio, does not extend to varying the substance of an earlier judicial
pronouncement.
In an addendum, the law also required that, even in such
an instance where the Court found a clerical error, correctable under the slip rule,
in its previous judgement, the Court still lacks the jurisdiction to correct
same suo-motu (by its own volition). The requirement of the law is
that such a correction must be predicated on an application brought before the
court by either party.
Thus, in the case at hand, i.e. HOLBORN (NIG.)
LTD. v. O.C.C. ENT. LTD. [2015] 1 NWLR 451, it is clear from the
record that it was the lower court, of its own volition, that proceeded to
embark on correcting its own judgment, as all that the respondent sought in its
motion on notice dated 11/7/2007 was for the court to direct the appellant to
file an account of profits made by it. The final judgement delivered by the
lower court on 13th October, 2023, did not contain any award as to
any damages allegedly suffered by the respondent. Even though an application
was brought for the correction of the judgement, the trial court still lacks
the jurisdiction to have its earlier decision altered for the simple fact that
such an alteration made by the trial court is not within the purview of what
amounts to the slip rule as an exception to the circumstance where a court
becomes functus officio once it delivers its judgement or makes its
pronouncements on a subject matter.
Written By:
Muhibudeen Qosim A.
(Deputy Chief Registrar, Solace Chambers—B.U.K)
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