PAYMENT OF PRESCRIBED FILING FEES AND THE COMPETENCE OF COURT PROCESSES THEREFROM

The law is settled that payment of prescribed filing fees is an important requirement in the commencement and prosecution of legal proceedings. Court processes are generally expected to be assessed and duly paid for before they can be regarded as properly filed. Failure to pay the required fees may affect the competence of a court process and, in appropriate circumstances, may result in the process being struck out.

The learned 5 Justices of the Supreme Court have, in the case of GE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (NIG.) LTD v. Q OIL & GAS SERVICES LTD. (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt.1520) 304 SC emphasised on the payment of prescribed filing fees and the competence of court processes therefrom.

A brief and simple narration of the fact of the case is as follows:

The dispute between the parties arose from a contractual relationship governed by a Master Services Agreement. The respondent, Q Oil & Gas Services Ltd, was engaged in the supply of personnel and related services to the appellant, GE International Operations (Nig.) Ltd. A disagreement subsequently arose when GE rejected a personnel supplied by Q Oil and declined to accept a replacement as allegedly provided for under the agreement. Believing that GE's actions amounted to a breach of contract which caused it financial loss, Q Oil instituted an action before the High Court seeking damages. The trial court found in favour of Q Oil, prompting GE to appeal the decision. It was during the appellate proceedings that the issue relating to the payment of prescribed filing fees arose.

The issue now is the proceedings in which questions were raised concerning the proper filing of certain court processes, and whether the prescribed filing fees had been paid. One of the parties contended that the process in question was incompetent because there was no indication that the appropriate fees had been paid as required by the rules of court.

The issue eventually reached the appellate courts, where the argument was made that failure to show evidence of payment rendered the process invalid and incapable of sustaining the appeal. From the Supreme Court record, the Court of Appeal's reasoning was essentially this:

"An appeal, by Order 7 Rule 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules, is deemed to have been brought when the Notice of Appeal is filed in accordance with the Rules of this Court. The fees prescribed in the 3rd Schedule of the Rules of this Court ... shall be paid for the filing of the appeal. It is the payment of the filing fee that vests legitimacy and validity on the court process... The Notice of Appeal is duly incompetent and is accordingly struck out."

The Court of Appeal relied principally on:

Order 7 Rule 11 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011; that an appeal is deemed brought when the Notice of Appeal is filed in accordance with the Rules.

Order 12 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011; that prescribed filing fees must be paid.

Third Schedule to the Court of Appeal Rules 2011, which prescribed the filing fee payable for the appeal. 

The Court of Appeal found that there was no evidence before it that the prescribed filing fee had been paid for the Notice of Appeal. Based on that, it concluded that the appeal had not been properly filed in accordance with the Rules and was therefore incompetent. It treated payment of filing fees as the act that gives validity and legitimacy to a court process. Consequently, it struck out the appeal.

In determining the matter, the Supreme Court considered the purpose of filing fees and the effect of any omission relating to their payment. The Court observed that payment of filing fees is indeed a necessary procedural requirement. However, the Court further emphasized that the absence of an endorsement or evidence of payment on the face of a court process does not automatically mean that the prescribed fees were not paid.

The Supreme Court held that before declaring a process incompetent on the ground of non-payment of fees, the court must carefully ascertain the true position. Where the defect complained of resulted from the omission or mistake of court officials, a litigant who has taken the necessary steps required of him should not be punished for such an error.

The Court further reiterated the long-standing principle that the mistake of a court registry or court official should not be visited upon an innocent litigant. Consequently, a court should be slow to strike out or dismiss a matter solely on the basis of a procedural irregularity that is attributable to the registry and not to the party. 

The significance of this decision lies in its promotion of substantial justice over technicality. While parties are expected to comply with procedural requirements, courts are equally enjoined to ensure that justice is not sacrificed on the altar of mere technical defects, especially where there is no evidence of bad faith or deliberate non-compliance.

Therefore, although payment of prescribed filing fees remains a mandatory requirement, courts will look beyond mere technical objections and examine the surrounding circumstances before invalidating a process. Where the fault lies with court officials rather than the litigant, the interest of justice demands that the litigant should not be made to bear the consequences.

The lesson from this case is that procedural rules are intended to aid the administration of justice and not to defeat it. Courts will generally protect diligent litigants from the adverse effects of administrative errors committed by court personnel.

It is important to note that the decision in the instant case of GE International Operations (Nig.) Ltd v. Q Oil & Gas Services Ltd does not diminish the importance of paying prescribed filing fees. Filing fees remain a fundamental requirement for the validity and competence of court processes. Failure to pay the appropriate fees may expose a litigant to objections, delays, unnecessary applications, and even the risk of having a matter struck out. Such defects can consume valuable judicial time, increase litigation costs, and in some instances jeopardize a party's right of appeal. The Supreme Court's intervention in this case was therefore not an endorsement of non-compliance, but rather an affirmation that where a litigant has acted diligently and any defect is attributable to the court registry, substantial justice should prevail over technicality.

About the Author: Rabiatu Abubakar Barde is a member of the Research and Litigation Directorate, Solace Chambers, Bayero University, Kano. She can be reached via 09046759722.